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THE DECLINE AND FALL OF A DETROIT
NEIGHBORHOOD: POLETOWN VS. G.M. AND THE
CITY OF DETROIT*
JOHN J. BUKOWCZYK**
Therefore the LORD God sent him forth from the Garden of
Eden, to till the ground from whence he was taken.
So he drove out the man; and he placed at the east of the Garden
of Eden Cherubims, and a flaming sword which turned every way,
to keep the way of the tree of life.
Genesis 3:23-24
I am neither lawyer nor legal scholar, but a social historian. Instead of
addressing tensions between a community and a legal system imposed by the
larger society in which the community resides, I should like to consider those
broader social and economic conflicts which formed the backdrop for those
with and without the legal system.
As might be expected of an historian, the approach I will follow is
historical. However, in examining the history of Detroit's "Poletown"
neighborhood and the conflict which pitted its residents against the General
Motors Corporation and the City of Detroit, I will underscore several under-
lying facts that perhaps depart from our preconception of the subject and
which in any event would affect deliberations of present and future public
policy. First, although the conflict in which Poletown residents became in-
volved won national attention in the past four years, it was not a new theme.
Such conflict with the larger society had touched their lives since the economic
and industrial revolution in the late nineteenth century impelled them to migrate
from their rural places of origin to cities like Detroit. Second, unlike a group
such as the Amish, the residents of the Poletown neighborhood were not a
homogeneous and highly cohesive group, but were divided by class, race, and
ethnicity. Even the Polish element resident in the area contained such divi-
sions. The neighborhood's internal division certainly affected its ability to resist
outside forces, and also meant that individuals and groups with different in-
terests would hold widely differing attitudes toward the conflict that ensued.
Finally, the issues involved in the Poletown affair in 1980-1981 extended beyond
questions of due process, compensation, and the good of the many as opposed
* A version of this paper was first presented in November 1982, at a Frances Lewis
Law Center Colloquium at Washington and Lee University, Lexington, Virginia. I should like
to thank Patricia Cooper and my fellow participants for their helpful discussion and comments
and Ginny Corbin, who typed the final version of the manuscript. Finally, I should like to com-
mend Frederick L. Kirgis, Jr., for his able work in putting together the program and for his
editorial advice.
** Assistant Professor of History, Wayne State University. B-A., 1972, Northwestern Univer-
sity; A.M., 1973, Harvard University; Ph.D., 1980, Harvard University.
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to the sacrifice of the few, among other issues. The most basic issue involved
power in American society.
The Detroit neighborhood most broadly referred to as "Poletown" spans
a roughly rectangular area of land extending from Gratiot Avenue northwest
to the City of Hamtramck and from the present-day site of the Detroit Medical
Center (viz. St. Antoine and Canfield) northeast to Mt. Elliott.' Since the
1940's, demographic change and various construction projects have reduced
the size of the Polish population in Poletown appreciably. The Detroit Com-
munity and Economic Development Department presently defines the Poletown
area as the tract between E. Grand Boulevard (north), Mt. Elliott (east), Mack
(south), and St. Aubin (west). The area actually demolished for the Central
Industrial Park (C. I. P.) Project was smaller still, consisting of the top third
of this urban rectangle, the portion of the above tract north of the 1-94
Expressway.
The history of Poletown can be divided into three broad phases, each
linked to specific stages in the economic development of the area. The first
phase lasted from about the 1860's through 1945, the period of industrializa-
tion. The second covered the years of the post-World War II recession through
1980 and can be called the period of "deindustrialization". It is still too soon
to say whether the final period will become a "period" at all, but the press
and the planners nonetheless have wishfully called it the period of
"reindustrialization".
I. THE PERIOD OF INDUSTRIALIZATION
Industrial activity in Detroit began during the two decades before the Civil
War, but it was the rapid industrial expansion during the post-war years that
determined the development of what would come to be known as the Poletown
area.2 Between the 1860's and the 1880's, the phenomenal growth of the
antebellum-period Detroit industry, the manufacture of stoves, ships, steam
engines, railroad cars, iron and steel, and tobacco products, swelled the de-
mand for unskilled labor and thus attracted large numbers of immigrants who
were then flooding into the country in search of work.
In the 1860's, the population of the industrial district on the northeast
side of the city, around Gratiot Avenue, still remained heavily German, but
soon would change. During these years, economic and political persecution
1. The most accessible unified source for the economic and demographic development
of the area is the Final Environmental Impact Statement, Central Industrial Park, the Cities of
Detroit and Hamtramck (Detroit, December 1980), at IV 32-IV 47, B 1-B-12, K 1-K-1i, prepared
by the Community and Economic Development Department of the City of Detroit [hereinafter
cited as E.I.S.]. I have relied on the statement extensively for this brief historical outline of the
development of the Poletown area.
2. See Charles K. Hyde, Detroit: An Industrial History Guide, Detroit Historical Society,
n.d. (early industrial history of Detroit); Sr. Mary Remigia Napolska, O.S.F., The Polish Im-
migrant in Detroit to 1914, Annals of the Polish R.C. Union Archives and Museum, Vol. X,
33-48, Polish Roman Catholic Union of America (1946) (overview of economic life of Detroit
and Polish settlement on Detroit's northeast side in nineteenth century).
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in the German-held partition of western Poland, coupled with the rise of large-
scale commercial agriculture there, impelled large numbers of so-called Ger-
man Poles to emigrate. 3 Those who found their way to the growing industrial
center of Detroit naturally gravitated toward the city's German-speaking in-
dustrial districts and to the Roman Catholic parishes that served them. The
German Poles first settled near Gratiot and later clustered along E. Canfield,
at the time called Fremont, and then moved northward along St. Antoine,
Hastings, Russell, Riopelle, and St. Aubin into what was then the outskirts
of the city. Polish men found jobs in the stove and railroad car companies
and as unskilled construction laborers, while Polish women labored in the
bean factories, match factories, and cigar works or did farm work, tailoring,
or domestic service. By 1872, the Poles had grown numerous enough, over
three hundred families, that they could erect their own parish church, St. Alber-
tus, at Canfield (Fremont) and St. Aubin. The new edifice stood in the center
of an area that the Detroit Free Press now calls Poletown.
As the eastside Polish population continued to grow, reaching at least
22,000 in 1885, it also became regionally more diverse in background. By the
early 1880's, German Polish emigration had declined due to improving
agricultural conditions in the German-held Polish partition and increased de-
mand for labor in the growing German industries which drained off surplus
labor. By this time, however, change had begun to sweep the Austrian-held
and Russian-held Polish partitions. In the former, overpopulation and acute
parcellization pushed the peasantry off the land; in the latter, peasant evictions,
large-scale, mechanized commercial agriculture, the conversion from grain
cultivation to sheep raising, and an industrial depression that followed the
Revolution of 1905 produced the same net effect. Many of these uprooted
Austrian Poles and Russian Poles found relief in emigration to the industrial
centers of Germany and Russia, to the grain fields of Prussia and Hungary,
and to the mills and factories in American cities like Detroit. The influx of
poorer and less educated Polish immigrants into Detroit's eastside Poletown
neighborhood caused frictions with the older German Polish settlers and became
,a factor in the factional strife that had begun to divide St. Albertus parish
in the 1880's. In the period between 1886-1889, factionalism finally resulted
in the formation of two new Polish parishes in the area, St. Josaphat's at
Hastings and Canfield and Sweetest Heart of Mary at Russell and Canfield.
St. Josaphat's principally served the Kashubian Poles while Sweetest Heart
of Mary had a heavily Austrian Polish and Russian Polish congregation.'
3. See STEFAN KENIEWICZ, Tim EMANCIPATION OF THE POLISH PEASANTRY (1969) (causes
of Polish emigration). See also LAWRENCE D. ORTON, POLISH DETROIT Alm THE KoLAsINs~
AFFAIR161-95 (1981) (history of early Polish settlement on Detroit's northeast side) [hereinafter
cited as ORTON].
4. Detroit Free Press, May 1, 1892 (cited in E.I.S., supra note 1, at IV 34).
5. See ORTON, supra note 3 (organization of Polish parishes in area); EDUARD ADAM
SKENDZEL, THE KoLAsNSKI STORY (1979) (same); Leslie Tentler, Who Is the Church? Conflict




Although the founding of two new Polish parishes institutionalized the
factional and regional differences which divided eastside Polonia, it also
accomplished another effect. The churches anchored the Polish community
and became magnets for additional Polish settlement into the area. In. the
1890's, Poletown covered the area bounded by Hastings (west), Illinois (south),
Joseph Campau (east), and Forest (north). By 1900, the Polish population
in this rectangle had reached 48,000.
Other even more powerful influences also affected Polish spatial distribu-
tion and the general settlement pattern of the area during these years and
thereafter. The opening of the Chene Street railway in 1889 and the introduc-
tion of electric street cars in the 1890's dispersed the growing Polish popula-
tion northward into the rapidly expanding working-class areas on the ever
more distant outskirts of the city. In the process, Chene became the major
Polish business street and would eventually form the axis which linked the
old center of Poletown with Hamtramk, Michigan's "Polish City".6 Of course,
the ethnic economic institutions, or the assortment of Polish small business,
became a magnet for Polish settlement in their own right. Perhaps even more
important in pulling the Poles northward and eastward, however, was the
growth of industry in this then suburban area. Factories opened in southern
Hamtramck and employed large numbers of Detroit Poles. These factories
included the American Radiator Company (1887), the Russel Wheel and Foun-
dry Company (1892), and the Acme White Lead and Color Works (circa 1906).
Industrial expansion and settlement on the farmland bordering Hamtramck
remained rather spotty in the late 1890's, but this too soon would change.
After 1900, the Beltine railroad spur connected the Detroit and Milwaukee
Railroad with the Grand Trunk Western System to create the famed Milwaukee
Junction. Thereafter, a U-shaped corridor of industry, mostly smelting, refin-
ing, casting, and car concerns, rapidly developed alongside the track, in effect
surrounding the residential area between St. Aubin and Mt. Elliot and pulling
settlement northward along the streets in between. Nevertheless, the location
of the young automobile industry in this industrial corridor, more than anything
else, determined the future of the expanding Milwaukee Junction area and
the Poletown neighborhood between 1900 and 1930.
The most significant single event in this area occurred in 1910 when the
Dodge Brothers opened their factory in Hamtramck to build engines for Henry
Ford. Four years later, after relations between Ford and the Dodge's
deteriorated, the Dodge's joined the parade of automobile manufacturers by
opening an automobile factory: the celebrated Dodge Main Works. By 1920,
Dodge Main employed approximately 18,000 workers, many of them Poles,
and stimulated the clustering of automobile parts manufacturers and ancillary
concerns in the Milwaukee Junction area. In 1928, Dodge Main was sold to
Chrysler Corporation, but the change in ownership did not affect its central
6. E.LS., supra note 1, at M 10.
19841
54 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
economic role in the area. From then on, the development of Poletown and
life at Dodge Main became inextricably linked. 7
Although Dodge Main became the chief formative influence on the develop-
ment of the Poletown area after 1910, several other industries loomed large
in the economic life of the district. Cadillac, Detroit Electric, and E-M-F (later
Studebaker) operated auto plants in the Milwaukee Junction area, while Fisher,
Murray, and Wilson were prominent auto body makers there. The area also
contained several large cigar factories, including the Consolidated Cigar
Factory, R.G. Dunn, and Bernard Schwartz Company. These factories
employed about 10,000 women workers, many of them Poles, and reportedly
ranked Detroit third behind New York and Philadelphia as the nation's largest
cigar-producing city.
Needless to say, such a multiplication of industrial facilities continued
to swell the area's Polish population. By 1914, Polish settlement had moved
north as far as Trombly. Soon it extended to East Grand Boulevard on the
north and, on the east, to McDougall. These Poletown newcomers differed
from the earlier Polish settlers in one interesting respect. Whereas the earlier
settlers had come to Detroit directly from Europe, the most recent Polish
arrivals had previous industrial experience in the Pennsylvania anthracite fields
or other American manufacturing centers.
With their numbers steadily augmented during these industrializing years,
the eastside Polish settlers soon easily outnumbered the previous German
residents of the area now called Poletown. The Poles, however, were not the
only group of immigrants to settle in the industrial district on Detroit's eastside.
Byzantine-rite Poles, Carpatho-Russians and other eastern Europeans, and a
smattering of Appalachian whites also settled in the Poletown section. Mean-
while, as the locus of eastside Polonia moved steadily northward and Poles
vacated the dwellings they first had occupied on the streets closest to Gratiot,
a new component was introduced into the area's population with the arrival
of Eastern European Jewish settlers, and black migrants from the rural South.
Reminiscent of the agricultural crises which had impelled Poles to migrate,
the blacks were displaced by the floods and boll weevil infestation which
recently had devastated cotton culture and crop diversification in parts of the
lower South.
While Polish factions often fought among themselves during the mass
migration years, the Poles sometimes found themselves rather broadly united
by the succession of bitter labor disputes that racked the area after the late
nineteenth century. Just as rural conflict united peasant communities against
large landholders in the nineteenth-century Polish countryside, industrial con-
flict repeatedly pitted Polish immigrants against factory owners, managers,
courts, and police. As early as 1893, industrial depression already had pro-
voked a riot among eastside Polish working people who merely wanted jobs.
7. See Charles K. Hyde, "Dodge Main" and the Detroit Automobile Industry, 1910-1980,
6 DETRorr IN PERSPECTIW 1-19 (1982) (history of Dodge Main).
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In the moral economy of the immigrant crowd, perhaps carried over from
the Polish countryside, unemployed Polish workers apparently believed they
possessed a social right to have work.' These attitudes seem to have persisted.
The following year as the depression deepened, an incident took place that
one historian has called "possibly the most celebrated labor clash in nineteenth-
century Detroit. ' 9 In the spring of 1894, Polish workers striking a water main
construction site on Connor's Creek to protest the imposition of low piece-
rates were fired upon by a besieged foreman and proceeded to stage a major
riot.
The Connor's Creek incident looms important in the annals of the
Poletown area because in it we find many of the major themes that recurred
in subsequent periods of conflict, including the recent controversy over the
proposed G.M. Cadillac plant. First, open conflict between Poletown's
working-class immigrants and the social and economic powers of Detroit
erupted at a time of imtense economic distress. Second, both the press and
Detroit civic authorities considered the conflict a blatant attack on "law and
order." By "law and order" they meant the preservation of private property
rights. Finally, the response of the immigrant workers to the phalanx of op-
position they encountered was to organize. After the Connor's Creek inci-
dent, Poles apparently flocked into a newly formed Polish Workers Alliance.
Connor's Creek thus produced a classic confrontation, but one that left
class and ethnic relations and the basic configuration of power in Detroit largely
unaltered. Native-born middle-class Detroit still controlled the law. They used
it to contain immigrant working-class protest during the economically depressed
nineties and thereby buttressed their own economic interests and class posi-
tion. Owing to their stellar success, Detroit would boast favorable business
conditions and a hostile, anti-union environment for the next few decades.
Working conditions in the factories of neighborhoods like Poletown remained
harsh and hours were long. Moreover, wages decreased with the cost-cutting
measures of the 1920's.
Detroit's reputation as an anti-union town lasted through the 1920's, but
the Great Depression of the 1930's changed everything. The Depression plunged
large numbers of Poletown's residents into under-employment or unemploy-
ment and shut down area factories, reducing the area's chances of survival
as either an industrial center or a thriving neighborhood. Yet depression did
not bring depopulation. Instead, the still teeming streets were electrified by
crisis-induced social ferment and union organizing fever.' 0 Following in the
wake of the celebrated Flint, Michigan, sit-down strike during Winter 1937,
the heavily Polish and largely female work force in the area's cigar industry,
about 4,000 workers, launched their own sit-down strike in six of Poletown's
8. ORTON, supra note 3, at 173.
9. See ORTON, supra note 3, at 172-81 (discussion of incident).
10. One brief review of labor unrest in Detroit during the Depression era is Union Town:
A Labor History Guide to Detroit (Workers Education Local 189, n.d.) [hereinafter cited as
Union Town].
19841
56 WASHINGTON AND LEE LA W REVIEW
large cigar plants. The sit-down strike was the longest in American labor
history.11 Overshadowing it in both size and significance, however, was the
famed sit-down strike by the heavily Polish force of 10,000 workers at the
Dodge Main plant in March 1937, the largest sit-down ever.'"
These strikes were significant because they featured the same themes that
had and would continue to characterize community protests against Detroit's
civic and industrial authorities. First, economic crisis precipitated the conflict
with the larger society. Second, the courts ruled that the sit-down strikers were
"conspiring to deprive ... [the corporation] . . .of its property."', 3 Third,
Hamtramck and Poletown strikers organized themselves as a means to press
their demands and claims. Finally, success depended upon community cohe-
sion and relied upon the material and moral support of the local network
of ethnic organizations.
The period of industrialization and industrial depression in Poletown is
illuminating both because it underscored the tensions that divided the area's
residents and because it revealed the forces working for community cohesion.
We have already seen how regional differences helped factionalize the eastside
Polish settlement. Clashing opinions about Polish nationalism and class ten-
sions between immigrant workers and shopkeepers sometimes had the same
effect. Yet it also must be recalled that Poletown was neither ethnically nor
racially homogeneous and tensions between the Polish majority and assorted
minority elements also existed. These tensions probably stemmed from com-
petition for jobs and housing in a tight depression market.' 4
As we have also seen, powerful forces fostered unity among the residents
of Detroit's Poletown. Polish inhabitants of the district drew together around
widely shared values: a deep attachment to family and neighborhood and a
pride in home ownership doubtless linked to the cultural legacy of peasant
land-hunger carried over from the Polish countryside.' 5 Ideologically, Poles
also were broadly united. Even if they disagreed about methods and a
socioeconomic platform, all favored national independence for a reunited
Poland. Meanwhile, powerful social bonds welded the eastside Polish com-
munity together. Poles patronized the same stores, bars, and shops and be-
11. See Union Town, supra note 10, at 19 (cigar makers in Poletown); Christopher H.
Johnson, A Forgotten World: The Women Cigar Workers of Detroit's Central Industrial Area
(unpublished manuscript).
12. Union Town, supra note 10, at 20-21.
13. Id. at 21.
14. Tensions also stemmed from job competition in the 1941-42 controversy surrounding
the Sojourner Truth housing project in the neighborhood northeast of Hamtramck, at Fenolon
and Nevada. See Thaddeus C. Radzialowski, Ethnic Conflict and the Competition for Jobs and
Housing: Polish American Workers in Detroit in the Inter- War Period, Conference on Poles
in North America, Multicultural History Society of Ontario, Toronto (Oct. 24, 1980) (Sojourner
Truth incident); AUGUST MEnR & ELLIOTT RUDWICK, BLACK DETROIT AND THE RISE OF THE UAW
129-32, 176-87 (1979).
15. See Thaddeus Radzialowski, The View From a Polish Ghetto: Some Observations on




longed to the same fraternal benevolent associations. More important still,
they were drawn together by their common Polish Roman Catholicism and
the parishes in which they worshipped. The establishment of a succession of
churches, St. Stanislaus, 1898 (at Dubois and Medbury), St. Hyacinth's, 1907
(at McDougall and Farnsworth), and Immaculate Conception, 1919 (at Moran
and Trombly), linked the Polish populace together and firmly rooted it to
the Poletown area. Finally, the organization of union locals in the area's fac-
tories knitted local people together. Significantly, these union-centered bonds
transcended racial and ethnic divisions in the area.
With the end of the Depression and the start of the Second World War,
employment once again soared in the newly unionized factories of Poletown.
Dodge Main alone employed 40,000 workers; another 20,000 found jobs in
other Poletown establishments. Indeed, so great was the wartime demand for
labor that for the first time large numbers of women began to do industrial
work. The Poletown boom, however, would prove ephemeral. As factory pro-
duction slowed during the inevitable post-war recession, Poletown entered a
second distinct period in its history, a period of "deindustrialization".
II. THE DENDUSTRIALIZATION OF DETROIT
For some of Poletown's industries, decline began as early as the First World
War; some never recovered from the slack 1930's. One classic case is the cigar
industry. Sagging demand for cigars owing to the cigarette's phenomenal rise
in popularity in the 1920's already had the cigarmakers reeling before the
Depression struck. Mechanization afforded the industry temporary relief, allow-
ing a drastic reduction in labor costs through substituting low-paid immigrant
women workers for skilled craftsmen, and producing a general shrinkage of
the Poletown labor force. When successful sit-down strikes in the 1930's finally
brought the women closer to a living wage, however, several of the factories
fled to Florida, where labor costs remained low and workers unorganized.
This cheap competition ultimately drove Detroit out of the cigar-making
business entirely and eliminated a large number of jobs in the Poletown area. 6
More significantly still to the fate of the area were wartime and postwar
developments in the auto industry, Poletown's largest employer.II In 1940 when
the Chrysler Corporation decided to locate its new tank arsenal outside of
Detroit in the northeastern suburb of Warren, Michigan, it became immediately
clear that the jobs Chrysler offered would entice city residents to abandon
older Detroit neighborhoods like Poletown. In the war's aftermath, Warren
became populated by the sons and daughters of the eastside Poles. Increas-
ingly, other factories also would locate, or relocate, in suburban areas, in part
because they offered lower rent or land costs and wide-open spaces that more
easily accommodated single-story modern plant design, and in part because
16. See Johnson, supra note 11 (disappearance of cigar industry in Poletown); Union Town,
supra note 10, at 19 (same).
17. See E.LS., supra note 1, at B 3 (shrinkage of automobile industry in Poletown area);
Hyde, supra note 7, at 23-29 (same).
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corporate planners had learned the lesson, taught by the World War II strategic
bombing campaign, that dispersal of industry out of city centers might in-
crease its chances of survival in the event of another war. By 1954, Detroit-
Packard and Hudson auto plants had closed and an assortment of industries
had moved to suburban locations like Warren and Sterling Heights which at-
tracted large numbers of Detroit Poles who followed their jobs out of the
city. Yet Poletown's far more serious loss during these years was the shrinkage
of operations and hence work force at Dodge Main. Its functions steadily
diminished since its acquisition by Chrysler in 1928. In the 1960's, it became
merely an assembly plant. The decline of Dodge Main was symptomatic of
the general industrial decline besetting the old Detroit neighborhoods like
Poletown. Between the 1950's and the early 1960's, Detroit's eastside lost an
estimated 71,000 jobs. 8
For economic reasons, population then began to forsake Poletown and
other central city areas. Social forces and public policy also hastened the grow-
ing suburban exodus. Upwardly mobile second generation Polish-American
veterans, sometimes using GI-Bill benefits, often sought better jobs and larger,
newer homes in the burgeoning suburbs. The availability of federally financed
home mortgages encouraged this movement, as did postwar federally funded
road and highway construction which made these suburban areas more
accessible. The brief infusion of displaced persons, or war refugees, into
neighborhoods like Poletown could not reverse the demographic results of
this massive second generation population drain. With its economy tumbling
and its people leaving, Poletown showed signs of decline by the 1950's.
As deindustrialization brought depopulation, depopulation fostered other
demographic changes. A decline in homeownership and an increase in renting
swept the area. Migration of black and poorer residents into the area began
in earnest. Urban renewal in the area south of Gratiot displaced the black
inhabitants there, who then moved northward into Poletown, following the
same route the Poles had taken sixty years earlier. In fact, a black presence
was well enough established in the area in 1950 that upper Poletown's
apparently first black church, Rose of Sharon Church of God in Christ, opened
at Chene and Trombly.
Throughout the postwar period, Poletown was changing, to be sure, and,
given the erosion of its economic base, probably declining as a viable
neighborhood. A succession of public policy choices in the 1950's and 1960's,
however, repeatedly attacked the physical integrity of the area and, more than
anything else, marked Poletown as the eventual likely target for the wrecker's
ball.' 9
The first disaster came in the early 1950's when plans to build Interstate
94, the Ford Freeway, were being laid. The expressway project produced a
18. E.I.S., supra note 1, at B 3. Historian Richard Place has also done research on post-
war industrial decline in the Milwaukee Junction area.
19. Most of the political choices outlined in FRANK B. & ARTHUR M. WOODFORD, ALL
OUR YESTERDAYS: A BmF HIsToRY OF DETROr (1969). See also E.I.S., supra note 1, at 36-37.
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flurry of litigation, land speculation, and uncertainty that ended only in March
of 1955 when the last families left the proposed road site. The eastbound 1-94
cut a broad swath through Poletown and had a catastrophic effect on the
life-chances of the district. Road construction decimated a large strip of Polish-
owned business on Chene, between Harper and Piquette, and severed what
would later become the Central Industrial Park from the rest of the Poletown
area. The Poles' St. Stanislaus parish, in particular, proved the big loser in
the piece. The new roadway displaced many of the church's parishioners and
cut it off from most of those who remained in the northernmost part of the
area.
2 0
In fairly rapid order, other major public construction projects tore into
the fabric of the Poletown neighborhood. In 1956, plans to establish the Detroit
Medical Center took shape, requiring the acquisition and razing of the western
tier of Poletown blocks, the zone of earliest Polish settlement in the area.
In 1967, the construction of a second freeway, Interstate 75 (Chrysler Freeway),
cut another wide corridor through the western fringe of the Poletown area,
causing further population displacement. 1-75 also left St. Josaphat's pre-
cariously perched on the edge of yet another sub-surface expressway. Mean-
while, the northernmost part of the area came under attack during this period,
as the southwest corner of Hamtramck was razed to create a Dodge Main
parking lot.
In the late 1960's, Poletown's sagging population statistics would still
receive a small boost when Yemeni immigrants and ethnic Albanians from
Montenegro, Yugoslavia, found themselves attracted by the low-cost housing
there. 2' Their arrival alone, however, could not turn the neighborhood around,
especially since large parts of it had been demolished and its economy in general
still was shrinking. Thus, more and more small businesses in the area fell vic-
tim to supermarket and department store competition and began to move or
close in the fifties and sixties. Racial tensions in the aftermath of Detroit's
1967 riots prompted increasing numbers of white residents to leave. By the
early 1970's, all three Catholic parochial schools in what would become the
Central Industrial Park had closed their doors for good.
The negative trend of the postwar period, factory closings, small business
removals, population decline, loss of housing stock, and shrinkage of average
family income, had left Poletown visibly blighted by the 1970's. On the positive
side, several ethnic and racial communities co-existed and struggled to survive
in one of the few largely integrated areas of the city. On the negative side,
however, the district attracted few new immigrants after 1973 and the average
age of Poletown's residents steadily increased, a sign that young families still
were not staying or settling in the area. Employment, meanwhile, continued
20. Area residents took exception to claims that the neighborhood experienced considerable
decay with the construction of 1-94. See Lynn Bachelor, Bryan D. Jones, & Richard Wang, Urban
Industrial Renewal in Detroit: A New Partnership or an Old Conspiracy?, paper presented at
the Southwest Political Science Association Meeting, Dallas, Texas, at 7 (Mar. 26-28, 1981).
21. See E.I.S., supra note 1, at IV 36-37 (1960's and 1970's).
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its sad decline. While city services deteriorated, crime mounted, and vacan-
cies, abandonments, arson, and delapidation became a general problem.
The hardest blow, however, was yet to come. The Dodge Main plant,
no matter how small its work force had become, still remained the industrial
anchor in the old Milwaukee Junction area. Nevertheless, the plant was out-
moded. In mid-1979, the Chrysler Corporation, faced with stiff foreign com-
petition, recession-depressed auto sales, and soaring company losses, announced
its decision to close the facility. Despite massive community protests like the
June 1979, "Save Dodge Main" rally in Hamtramck, production in the plant
halted abruptly in January 1980, and 3,000 workers lost their jobs. Deindus-
trialization had reached its lowest ebb. 22
Several points emerge in this brief review of the history of deindustrializa-
tion in Detroit's Poletown area. First, the area suffered from economic
developments beyond its control, developments even beyond the control of
Detroit's political leaders. The politicians, however, failed to address, let alone
solve, the problem of post-war economic erosion, tacitly accepted the decline
of the old urban core, and thus presided over Poletown's gradual demise.
Second and more consciously, however, various political leaders made public
policy decisions that pointedly undercut the viability of neighborhoods like
Poletown. Demolition of large urban tracts, for example, reduced the critical
population mass needed to sustain area parishes and local businesses. Similar-
ly, as a result of those decisions, physical barriers were erected that interfered
with the patterns of movement and association on which the survival of the
whole district depended. Third, implementation of the public policy decisions
on such matters as freeway routes and location of the medical center gave
rise to a self-fulfilling prophecy. Such decisions presumed Poletown a blighted
and expendable area. In turn, the presumption encouraged the spread of blight,
which in the future would make the area more expendable. This downward
spiral thus formed the background for the plan that promised to inaugurate
a new period in the history of Poletown and of Detroit: a period of
reindustrialization.
III. REINDUSTRIALIZATION IN DETROIT: GENERAL MoToRs
At the time of the Dodge Main closing, Chrysler was not the only Detroit
automaker experiencing hard times. The General Motors Corporation (G.M.),
although financially healthier than Chrysler, also faced many of the same
economic problems as the smaller car maker.23 In response to its own predica-
ment, G.M. unveiled an ambitious 40 million dollar plant modernization plan
in the spring of 1980. The plan called for renovation of G.M. engine plants
in Flint and Pontiac; transmission-related changes at Flint, Warren, Ypsilan-
ti, and Bay City facilities; construction of a new assembly plant in Orion
Township, Michigan, a suburb north of Pontiac; and phasing out two of its
22. See Union Town, supra note 10, at 2 (closing of Dodge Main).
23. See Gary Blonston, Poletown: The Profits, the Loss, Detroit Free Press, Nov. 22,
1981 (Special Supplement) (outline of G.M.'s planning in 1980).
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large installations in Detroit, the aging Clark Avenue and Fisher Body Fleet-
wood plants. 24 Nevertheless, out of a blend of civic commitment and shrewd
appreciation of Detroit's experienced automotive labor force, G.M. offered
to build another large new plant in the city, on one condition. The condition
was that the city would offer a suitable plant site, a roughly rectangular, readily
available, 450-500 acre tract with railroad and highway access, that would
accommodate already existing "green field" suburban plant designs.
25
Since the City of Detroit still smarted from the recent closing of its large
Uniroyal Tire plant and from its repeated failure to realize several opportunities
for other new factories, the administration of Mayor Coleman Young was
anxious to accommodate the giant automaker. In most of the sites the city
offered, however, G.M. had little interest. Yet G.M. did eye one large parcel
which included the old Dodge Main property in Hamtramck and the Detroit
neighborhood immediately to its south, or roughly the northern third of the
Poletown area.
When the city committed itself to the Poletown/Dodge Main location,
serious negotiations over the proposed Central Industrial Park (C.I.P.) en-
sued. The outcome would be strongly influenced by federal and state
legislation. 26 G.M. dangled the promise of a brand-new 500 million dollar
Cadillac plant for the area, with the retention of 6,000 automotive jobs, 4,000
temporary construction jobs, over 20,000 jobs created by the multiplier effect
of the plant, and appreciable long-term revenues from those workers' city in-
come tax payments. In return, G.M. wanted the site cleared, an undertaking
projected to cost 200 million dollars, and the opportunity to buy the land
at the bargain price of 8 million dollars. In addition, G.M. also sought a
substantial tax abatement on the facility. The giant automaker eventually
accepted the lower offer of a twelve-year, fifty percent tax abatement, still worth
a substantial 60 million dollars.
Briefly, Detroit political leaders entertained the possibility of the City itself
building the new plant and leasing it to G.M., but such mammoth plans towered
far beyond the means of a municipality in dire financial straits. The City,
therefore, explored the G.M. proposal more deeply and hastily built a consen-
sus in favor of it among Detroit civic leaders. Drawing upon political ties
between the Young and Carter Administrations, the City persuaded the U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to foot the bill for
site acquisition, half of which the City would have to pay back. HUD com-
plied despite the fact that the ratio of private to public dollars involved in
the project, 2.5 to 1, lagged appreciably below the HUD optimum, 4 to 1.27
With the financing in place and with the full support of the United Auto
24. Detroit Free Press, Oct. 17, 1980.
25. Talk by Lynn Bachelor, Political Science Department, Wayne State University, Detroit,
Michigan (Dec. 8, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Lynn Bachelor Talk].
26. See William Safire, Poletown Wrecker's Bal, N.Y. Times, Mar. 30, 1981; Lynn Bachelor,
Reindustrialization in Detroit: Capital Mobility and Corporate Influence, IV J. URB. An'. 38 (1982).
27. See Jeanie Wylie, A Neighborhood Dies so GM Can Live, THE VnjAoE VoicE 8-14
(July 1981).
1984]
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
Workers (U.A.W.) and, as it would turn out, the Roman Catholic Archdiocese
of Detroit, the Young Administration met G.M.'s terms and the bargain was
sealed.
28
The area slotted for acquisition and demolition, the so-called Central In-
dustrial Park, included old Dodge Main, a building with historical and
sentimental significance but for the past eight months a silent, empty hulk,
The area also included the property to the south. The C.I.P. tract, 465.5 acres,
1,176 buildings, 143 businesses and other institutions (including sixteen
churches, two schools, and one hospital), 1,362 households, and 3,438 peo-
ple, was not an urban void but still a populated neighborhood. Of that popula-
tion, estimates indicate that forty to sixty percent were black, including elderly,
young, and middle-aged families; thirty to fifty percent were Polish, about
500 to 700 households, mostly elderly; five to ten percent were ethnic Alba-
nians from Yugoslavia; one to four percent were Yemeni; and as many as
two percent each were Ukrainian, Filipino, and southern white. 29 The entire
C.I.P. area was integrated, but the northwestern half was more heavily black
and the southeastern half more heavily Polish and Albanian.
Oddly enough, because the construction of 1-94 had cut it off from poorer
and more dilapidated parts of Poletown and Detroit, and because of its close
proximity to the far more stable community of Hamtramck, the C.I.P. area
was the most isolated and self-contained area of Poletown and, therefore,
probably more viable as a neighborhood than other parts of the district. In-
deed, the C.I.P. area and the area to the south recently had shown healthful
signs of community organization. A Poletown Area Revitalization Task Force
operated there and the area enjoyed the protection of ERACE, a community
C.B. radio patrol. In the mid-1970's, the six Polish Roman Catholic parishes
in the area formed the North Eastside Community Organization and later,
in 1978, the Poletown Inter-Parish Council. Out of these efforts also arose
an organization of area merchants in September 1978, the Poletown Develop-
ment Corporation.3" Incidentally, the Poletown Inter-Parish Council resur-
rected the word "Poletown", long out of use, and took it as the name for
the Chene corridor, the area bounded by Mt. Elliott (east), Willis (south),
St. Antoine (west), and the Hamtramck city limits (north)."
Despite this recent vitality, announcement of the proposed Central In-
dustrial Park left the area's residents numbed. In the face of the neighborhood's
28. See Lynn W. Bachelor, Reindustrialization in Detroit: A Case Study in "Successful"
Policy Implementation, paper presented at the 1982 Regions V and VI American Society for
Public Administration Conference, Louisville, Kentucky (Nov. 16-19, 1982) (full discussion of
City's decision-making and implementation process).
29. E.I.S., supra note 1, at K 1-K 4. In 1976, the larger area bounded by E. Grand Boulevard
(north), Mt. Elliott (east), Gratiot (south), and the Grand Trunk Railroad tracks (west) held a
population that was an estimated 68% black and 31% white. See Detroit Free Press, June 23, 1980.
30. Bachelor, Jones, & Wang, supra note 20, at 19-20.
31. See Lawrence Chominski, The History of Detroit's Polonia, Hamtramck Citizen (Oct.
1-10, 1981) (series) (sympathetic overview of early history of Poletown and its more recent travail).
See also Blonston, supra note 23.
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imminent extinction, local groups dropped rehabilitation plans and the area
remained largely quiet between June and October 1980, perhaps awed by the
impressive array of forces, G.M., the City, HUD, the Carter Administration,
the U.A.W., and the Archdiocese, aligned against it. 32 In retrospect, this would
prove a critical period. A controversial state survey found that a majority
of residents in the C.I.P. area favored the City's offer to buy them out at
prices above market value. Thus, plans for the project continued apace. By
the time opposition finally organized, it was too little, too late.
As in past cases when the community faced threats from without, Poletown
residents eventually began to organize. Michigan law already had authorized
formation of a Central Industrial Park Citizens District Council (C.D.C.), but
allowed City officials to appoint its members.3 3 Moreover, the Michigan enact-
ment made the C.D.C. dependent on the city for technical information, and
permitted the City to ignore the body's recommendations.34 The first real anti-
C.I.P. meeting took place in August 1980, at St. Hyacinth's Church. Little
came of this meeting. Those present were not immediately affected by the
Central Industrial Park project, since St. Hyacinth's lay several blocks below
the target area. Drawing upon the ethnic organizational network as earlier
community protests had done, the first organized opposition within the pro-
ject zone finally emerged in October 1980, when the C.I.P. area, which
henceforth often monopolized the name "Poletown", was organized by the
Poletown Inter-Parish Council. The organization bore the stamp of the area's
Polish Roman Catholic parishes, although well over half of Poletown's popula-
tion was no longer Polish. Recognizing this demographic reality, the organiza-
tion shortly adopted a new and more inclusive name: the Poletown
Neighborhood Council.
In the organization and activities of the Poletown Neighborhood Council
we can see the complicated and diverse motives of the various political actors
and factions in the C.I.P. area. Residents organized to defend their homes,
their long-standing association with this aging urban neighborhood, and their
aggrieved sense of right and rights. They were joined by local political operators
who allegedly used the Poletown cause as a political vehicle; assorted small
property holders who defended their own economic position more than the
community's interests; and, in the waning days of the neighborhood, a variety
of political activists from outside the affected area, who had larger ideological
axes to grind. 3-
Sides in the controversy, meanwhile, also did not follow predictable lines.
32. SouTm END (Detroit) (Sept. 8, 1982).
33. MICH. Comp. LAws § 125.1612 (Supp. 1981) (MiciH. STAT. ANN. § 5.3520 (12) (Callaghan
1982)).
34. Bachelor, Jones, & Wang, supra note 20, at 13-14. See MICH. Comp. LAws §§ 125.1613,
125.1615 (3) (1976) (MICH. STAT. ANN. §§5.3520 (13), 5.3520 (15) (3) (Callaghan 1982)).
35. Included in the assortment of participants in opposition to the C.I.P. was a small group
of Detroit filmmakers, at least one of whom was arrested by police at one of the final Poletown
protests. Their film, Poletown Lives, a 16 mm. documentary, is available from the Information
Factory, 3512 Courville, Detroit, Michigan 48224.
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The Central Industrial Park issue did not polarize black and white but, if
anything, may have divided the younger residents of the area, mostly black
and in need of jobs, from the older residents, black and white, who had a
large and long-standing stake in community, neighborhood, and homes. Finally,
even within Detroit-area Polonia, feelings about the project were sometimes
ambiguous and contradictory. Some area residents most assuredly favored the
HUD-funded buy-out. Members of the nearby Hamtramck Polish community,
who may have been expected automatically to have sympathized with the
Poletowners, themselves may have felt torn. Not directly affected by the site
acquisition and demolition, they stood to gain substantially from the boost
the new plant presumably would mean for the remainder of the area and from
the help it undeniably would give to the Hamtramck tax base.
Even as opposition continued to mount, interests and opinions within the
C.I.P. area were sharply divided. Meanwhile, the project proceeded. During
Winter 1980-81, Dodge Main was demolished. As the ancient structure slowly
fell, the sinking feeling grew among Poletown residents that the end for them
too was nearing. By March 1981, eighty percent of the residents of the C.I.P.
site had been persuaded, or subtly pressured, to accept the City's offer. Against
the hold-outs, the City of Detroit activated Michigan's new and controversial
"quick take" law,36 enacted by the legislature as an economic development
measure, allegedly without G.M.'s prior knowledge, just two short months
before G.M. announced its desire to build in Detroit. The "quick take" law
cut the length of time for condemnation from years to mere weeks by allow-
ing a city like Detroit to take title to a property before a court determines
the amount of compensation in the contested case.37 The final assault on the
neighborhood began. Determined residents and the Poletown Neighborhood
Council countered with a barrage of legal maneuvers, court orders, and briefs.
By late winter/early spring, conflict in Poletown had turned desperate
and ugly. The area was swept by a wave of arsons in scattered empty buildings,
which Poletowners charged was the work of demolition sub-contractors who
allegedly hoped to frighten neighborhood hold-outs into leaving the area.38
Mid-March 1981, also witnessed a strident pro-C.I.P. demonstration which
Poletown sympathizers alleged was organized by the City.3 9 Finally, a new
political force came into play with the arrival of a Poletown Support Team
organized by G.M. critic and consumer advocate Ralph Nader. As more and
more residents lost or left their Poletown homes, the Nader forces and other
outside sympathizers increasingly moved to the forefront of the anti-C.I.P.
campaign.
Throughout the winter and spring, much of the community opposition
to the Central Industrial Park coalesced around the Immaculate Conception
36. MICH. Comp. LAws §§ 213.51 - 213.77 (Supp. 1981) (MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 8.265 (1)
- 8.265 (27) (Callaghan Supp. 1982)).
37. Lynn Bachelor Talk, supra note 25. See MICH. CoMP. LAws §§ 213.55 - 213.57 (Supp.
1981) (MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 8.265 (5) - 8.265 (7) (Callaghan Supp. 1982)).
38. Wylie, supra note 27.
39. Detroit Free Press, Mar. 15, 1981.
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Church at Moran and Trombly. If area Poles were attached to their homes,
they were doubly attached to this hard-earned building which symbolized their
faith, anchored their neighborhood, and sheltered their families through three
generations. By spring, the Immaculate Conception pastor, Rev. Joseph
Karasiewicz, emerged as a prominent anti-C.I.P. spokesperson. The lonely
church, meanwhile, became a symbol of resistance and a martyr whose
parishioners would picket G.M. headquarters with signs that read: "G.M.
Desecrates Churches." Therefore, it was probably for reasons of self-interest
that G.M. finally offered to disassemble the church and move it to another
site. Predictably, the Archdiocese rejected the G.M. offer, and the onus for
the church's demise shifted from G.M. Chairman Roger Smith to Detroit's
Cardinal Dearden. To no avail, the subsequent closing of Immaculate Con-
ception on Mother's Day, May 10, 1981, drew the first large anti-C.I.P. crowd
to the area, a crowd of about 1,400. By June, the City had taken possession
of the church; and the following month, after police arrested civil disobe-
dience protesters, wrecking crews razed the structure.
With the demolition of Immaculate Conception, the City had broken the
community opposition and finally cleared the way for the C.I.P. project to
begin. Nevertheless, in the period between the unveiling of the original plan
for the project and the summer of 1981, auto sales continued to slump, the
recession steadily deepened, and uncertainty clouded the future of the Central
Industrial Park and, with it, Detroit reindustrialization. Delays in work on
the new plant, downward revision of projected plant employment figures, and
rumors about what and how much the plant ultimately would produce inter-
mittently troubled Detroiters, even as the silver-white girders of a new factory
began to rise from the huge, flat plain where part of Poletown once stood.
But what of the people of the Poletown area? Taking their cue from their
erstwhile neighbors' struggle with the corporation and the City, residents in
the extant part of Poletown have begun to organize."' As for those who were
displaced, about half reportedly have moved to other eastside Detroit
neighborhoods, while the rest left for Detroit's northeastern suburbs.' A
University of Michigan study found an "overall improvement in the quality
of life for these elderly residents."" 2 Yet a number of lawsuits arising from
the project still remain unsettled. Several elderly residents died soon after their
uprooting, and on December 14, 1981, Rev. Karasiewicz passed away.
IV. POLETOWN: Tim IssuEs
I will now review some of the issues that surfaced in the recent conflict
between the defiant Poletowners and the backers of the plan to create the
Central Industrial Park. The following discussion remains somewhat tentative
40. See SouTm END (Sept. 8, 1982).
41. Lawrence Chominski, Final Notes, CrrIzEN (Dec. 17, 1981).
42. Leon A. Pastalan, Professor of Architecture and Co-director of the University's National
Policy Center on Housing and Living Arrangements for Older Americans, quoted in N.Y.Times,
June 29, 1982 (I should like to thank attorney John Starrs for bringing this study to my attention).
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and cautious. Nonetheless, I believe that several important points emerge from
even the most casual or cursory examination of the conflict and that those
points may suggest areas in which legal reform is desirable or needed.
Throughout the C.I.P. fight, argument on both sides of the debate
understandably tended to be very present-oriented and highly emotional. From
the outset, neighborhood people resented the indecent haste and high-handed
way (C.I.P. proponents called it exemplary efficiency) in which they felt their
homes were being taken from them. In the process, both G.M. and City
authorities revealed that they neither understood nor perhaps cared to under-
stand the cultural values that underlay the attachment of the Polish residents
to their parish and the rootedness of the Poles and others to their homes and
neighborhood. Hence, City officials displayed greatest insensitivity. During
the height of the controversy, Mayor Young charged that Poletown was a
"myth" and that Hamtramck was the "real" Poletown."3 As one anonymous
Poletown resident commented to me, it would have been bearable had the
City simply said that Poletown must be sacrificed so that Detroit might live;
but what really hurt was the City's self-justificatory and insulting insistence
that the area was a blighted urban wasteland not worth preserving.
Interestingly, popular resentment of the cultural insensitivity of the
decision-makers eventually extended not only to City and G.M. officials but
also to the administration of the Detroit Archdiocese, which Poletowners ac-
cused of collusion with "the enemy". Poletown resentment against the
Archdiocese arose when the Archdiocese tacitly endorsed the C.I.P. plan and,
especially, after Church officials declined G.M.'s offer to move and preserve
Immaculate Conception Church. When final closing of the Church was set
for May 10, 1981, some Poles expressed outrage that this Marian shrine of
an ethnic group so deeply devoted to the Blessed Virgin Mary should be closed
in Mary's month, on Mother's Day. Indeed, some even suspected that the
date was chosen in order to ensure the church closing before Cardinal Dearden's
Polish-American successor, Archbishop-designate Edmund Szoda, took over
the chancery, and could reverse Dearden's ruling. 44
Such anti-hierarchical suspicion and resentment, however intense, were
hardly new in Polish Detroit. The factional strife that split St. Albertus parish
in the 1880's included demands for parishioner control over parish property
and complaints about the imperious, Irish-dominated hierarchy. Since the
1880's, Polish-Americans have remained mindful of their position of relative
inferiority in Church affairs in the United States, while criticism of Detroit's
Archdiocesan administration has surfaced sporadically. Recently, for exam-
ple, Polish parishioners in Detroit have alleged that Church officials have
diverted funds collected in Polish parishes to black parishes in the diocese 41
and that Cardinal Dearden secretly controlled the Polish priests who helped
43. CITZEN (Oct. 15, 1981).
44. DZIENNIK POLSKI (Detroit) (May 8-9, 1981) (I should like to thank Regina Koscielska
for furnishing me with a copy of this material).
45. Radzialowski, supra note 15, at 142.
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found Detroit's celebrated Black-Polish Conference in the aftermath of the
Detroit riots.46
The cultural insensitivity on the part of G.M., the City, and the
Archdiocese bruised the Poletowners' sensitivities, to be sure. But it also took
on more material significance, influencing the way in which neighborhood
activists framed their opposition to the Central Industrial Park. This occurred
in several ways. First, the Poletowners' arguments centered around the defense
of their culture and the somewhat subjective and sentimental, if no less valid,
contention that their neighborhood was "viable". Second, as City officials
charged that Poletown was a myth and a recent invention, neighborhood
defenders advanced the claim, historically accurate yet more debatable since
the construction of 1-94, that the area designated for the C.I.P. was an in-
tegral part of the entire Chene corridor and not a detached or expendable
appendage, as the City alleged. It was indeed true that regardless of whether
the name "Poletown" had lain dormant until 1978, structurally, functionally,
and historically the entire area was interrelated. Finally, C.I.P. critics levelled
two damning charges against the process of site selection and against the
underlying rationale for demolition. In the first instance, some charged that
the Mayor was playing politics when he offered up the Poletown site because
politically there was less to lose by demolishing an integrated neighborhood
filled with elderly Poles than a black neighborhood filled with Coleman Young
supporters. In the second instance, project critics also charged that white sup-
porters of the C.I.P. considered the area blighted for racist reasons. To them,
a large black population allegedly signified "blight" by definition. If the
criticisms are true, neither would have been surprising. Urban mayors do make
political decisions and racism sometimes has influenced white political attitudes
and behavior.
Because so much of the discussion of the C.I.P. site had centered around
the question of blight, Poletown advocates had to make the difficult case for
the intrinsic worth of the area. To do this, they pointed out that epic events
in 1930's labor history had taken place on the C.I.P. site. Knowledgeable per-
sons like Richard Hodas, Vice-President of the Poletown Neighborhood Coun-
cil, sensitively and cleverly explicated the arcane architectural merits and fading
glory of long neglected buildings in the area. Such efforts were intended to
rejuvenate Poletown's reputation, but also had a more pointed political pur-
pose. Although law does not protect persons living in an area from displace-
ment, preservation and historic landmark regulations might be used to pro-
tect buildings and thereby possibly defend an entire area. However well inten-
tioned, such exercises in architectural, social, and labor history digressed from
other more pressing public policy questions.
More to the point, therefore, was the Poletowners' claim that Detroit could
"have its cake and eat it too," or that plant design modification could drastical-
ly reduce the area which G.M. required and thereby could give Detroit its
46. Audience comment made during talk by Rev. Daniel Bogus, Co-founder of the Black-
Polish Conference, at Wayne State University (Nov. 30, 1981).
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factory and leave the people their houses.47 The fact that present plant design
proposed to replace much of the condemned area not with factory buildings,
but with a lawn and a large parking lot fueled the anger of the residents who
faced eviction. G.M. balked at design changes, however, and as a result
arguments for design modification dropped from consideration.
Meanwhile, the anti-C.I.P. argument that struck closest to the heart of
the G.M./City position raised questions whether the publicly funded Central
Industrial Park was the best way to solve Detroit's financial woes and whether
the large G.M. installation would really deliver on its promises of tax revenues
and jobs. Senator William Proxmire thought that pumping public money into
a Cadillac plant might be less than wise when "down-sizing", building smaller,
lighter, less expensive, and more fuel-efficient cars, was in vogue. In light
of the persistent strength of foreign competition, others wondered whether
diversification of the Detroit economy might be a sounder plan for recovery
than placing all hope on the automobile."
In responding to the Proxmire argument, G.M. brushed aside questions
about the public good and pointed out a market fact. Since demand for luxury
cars remains very stable year to year, Detroit workers who produced them
would be better sheltered from cyclical economic downturns than if they
manufactured economy-class vehicles. Less easy to counter, however, was the
set of questions concerning the number of jobs the plant would create. Critics
contended that the 20,000-plus figure was highly exagerated and, in any event,
failed to consider the 9,000 area jobs that would disappear when the site was
cleared. 9 Moreover, because of an escape clause in the C.I.P. agreement with
the City, critics argued that G.M. actually committed itself to no minimum
number of in-plant jobs, not even to the downwardly revised figure of 3,000.
Skeptics foresaw a giant ghost plant, populated by a work force of faceless
robots. Finally, with a succession of delays and postponements in construc-
tion, the planned Summer 1983, opening of the plant steadily receded. Bitter
residents displaced from their homes wondered whether the Cadillac plant
would ever open.
In terms of timing and popular responses, the Poletown protest of the
1980's very much resembled conflicts during the 1890's and 1930's, but it also
differed from them in one important respect. The area's working-class Poles
of the earlier periods had collided with the law and the courts, which seemed
to defend the status quo of class relations and private property rights. More
recently, legislative reforms associated with the New Deal and the Great Society
seemed to change the law and the courts from apparent agents of class power
to instruments for social reform and neutral arbiters in an arena for conflict
resolution. In the Poletown case, we do not clearly find labor in conflict with
capital, but a clash of small against large property rights. The C.I.P. affair,
47. See Wylie, supra note 27.
48. See DAN LumrA & JACK RussuL, RA-nONAL RaNDUsTRu'iAiZoN: AN ECoNOzaC Aa-iDA
FOR DETROr (1981); BLONSTON, supra note 23.
49. DzmNm Po.smx (May 8-9, 1981).
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therefore, seemingly departed from earlier local struggles since the community
did not clearly contend with the law, but rather contended within it.
Even with all the protest and pickets, press coverage and pamphletering,
the resolution of the Poletown dispute took place in the halls of justice. The
claims of the area's residents ultimately depended upon how a succession of
jurists and lawyers would view the legality of Michigan's controversial "quick
take" law and the use of eminent domain proceedings to acquire land not
for public, but for private use. Apparently, a 1954 ruling of the Supreme Court
endorsed the principle embedded in the C.I.P. "quick take" eminent domain
proceedings. Writing for the majority in Berman v. Parker,"° liberal Justice
William 0. Douglas upheld the District of Columbia's ability to condemn a
department store for an urban renewal project likely to be undertaken by private
developers. Cognizant of this decision, the Poletown Neighborhood Council's
attorney, Ronald Reosti, decided to bring his client's claims into state court,
where federal precedent did not automatically obtain and where the law re-
mained far more ambiguous. Despite Reosti's tactical maneuver, the Michigan
Supreme Court chose to follow federal precedent. In early May 1981, the five
to two majority ruled that eminent domain enables government to force prop-
erty owners to relinquish their property for just compensation when such ac-
tion serves a public purpose, even a public purpose to be carried out by a
private corporation."'
Michigan Supreme Court Justice James L. Ryan, however, was not so
sure. In his dissenting opinion, Ryan drew the distinction between a public
use, such as a road, that can be used by all, and a public purpose, such as
a job-creating private enterprise, and argued that this extension of the law
of eminent domain "seriously jeopardized the security of all private property
ownership. '5 2 On the ruling, Thomas Olechowski, President of the Poletown
Neighborhood Council, and Rev. Karasiewicz had a succinct comment:
The use of eminent domain by Multi-National, private, Corporate
powers, [sic] turns democracy into a sham and working people's prop-
erty deeds into meaningless papers; lends sovereign state police power
to secretive, anti-democratic, profit-centered corporations, who use
the tax structure as just another vehicle and the government as its
willing tool and accomplice.5 3
Searching for a villain in the Poletown melodrama, we might easily ap-
prehend G.M. G.M., however, was only furthering its own institutional in-
terests and trying to maximize profits throughout the controversy. We,
therefore, can no more blame G.M. for taking Poletown than we can blame
50. Blonston, supra note 23, at 53; see also Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of
Detroit, 410 Mich. 616, 304 N.W. 2d 455 (1981).
51. See Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 410 Mich. 616, 304 N.W. 2d
455 (1981).
52. Id., 410 Mich. at _ , 304 N.W. 2d at 464-65 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
53. DZIENNIK POLSK! (May 8-9, 1981).
1984]
WASHINGTON AND LEE LA W REVIEW
the giant white shark for mauling the fleshy legs of the hapless swimmer. It
is merely in the nature of the beast and, as presently constituted, also of the
giant corporation. Nevertheless, the General Motors Corporation seems
culpable in one important respect. We cannot pronounce here whether the
C.I.P. project was good or bad, or how much it was good or how much bad.
Nor can we resolve the issue whether in this particular case community
/neighborhood or corporate interests should have prevailed. What we can con-
clude is that not only commuftity/neighborhood and corporate interests were
at stake, but also the larger public interest. We can observe how the giant
corporation exerted a disproportionate, indeed, a determinant influence upon
the public policy process. In short, the game was rigged.
It is difficult to plumb the depths of the alleged links between corpora-
tions and the executive and legislative arms of the government. Clear, let alone
indictable, connections may be rare and the point of commerce may lie in
the business of politics and the realm of shared ideology. Nevertheless, as
political scientists Lynn Bachelor, Bryan Jones, and Richard Wang have argued,
perhaps the lines of influence are simpler still.54 In the Poletown situation,
cut-throat competition among municipalities for development money and the
geographic mobility of corporate capital gave G.M. all of the cards. On several
issues, however, City negotiators won small concessions.55 In the meantime,
the City caved in to the larger motif of corporate pressure, when G.M. spelled
out non-negotiable plant requirements under the threat of locating the factory
elsewhere. 6 As a result, G.M. reaped what Bachelor has called the "corporate
surplus . . . locational incentives in excess of the minimum necessary to at-
tract the facility." ' 57 Herein lay a fundamental irony: ". . . those cities most
in need of increased revenues are likely to make the greatest overpayments,
and those corporations with the greatest profit margins are likely to receive
the largest surpluses from them."' 58 Private corporate power, therefore, often
can contravene or circumvent the larger public interest. More worrisome still,
recently discussed federal plans to create "urban enterprise zones" could
escalate interstate and intrastate competition for tax abatements and other
incentives, and thus further undercut the economies of those municipalities
the programs putatively intend to assist. 59
Poletown advocates charged that the corporation not only influenced the
legislative and executive functions of City government in the C.I.P. situation,
54. See Bachelor, supra note 26, at 35.
55. The small concessions included terms of the tax abatement, reduction of site size, site
clearance requirements, and phases in demolition. Lynn Bachelor Talk, supra note 25.
56. See Bachelor, Jones, & Wang, supra note 20 (full account of "negotiation").
57. Bachelor, supra note 20. See also B.D. Jones, L.W. Bachelor, & R. Wang, Rebuilding
The Urban Tax Base: Local Policy Discretion and the Corporate Surplus, paper presented at
the Midwest Political Science Association Meeting, Cincinnati, Ohio (1981).
58. Bachelor, supra note 26, at 48.
59. Id. As an alternative, Bachelor suggests that federal policy could equalize land and
labor costs among competing cities and target federal grants to "needy" cities and to certain
types of industry, with an eye toward encouraging economic diversification. Id.
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but that G.M. influenced the independent judiciary as well. The second allega-
tion is harder to prove. Moreover, one need not posit corporate pressure to
explain the Michigan Supreme Court's decision. Even opponents of the court's
action might have conceded that, at worst, the five to two majority may only
have affirmed the fait accompli of recent City-mandated demolition in the
C.I.P. area and thirty-five years of administrative undermining and neglect.
Poletowners suspected collusion between the courts and the corporation,
however, because they might have had little faith in the distant institutions
of an impersonal and bureaucratic government and also because they might
have recalled how courts had operated during past conflicts that had involved
their community. However arrived at, the court's decision did not allay these
fears for, after all, it did not give them relief. As a result, Poletowners thought
they again glimpsed the law's age-old Janus-face. Though the courts had
appeared an arena for conflict resolution and a neutral arbiter, the Poletown
decision was perceived as a return to the judiciary's former role as bulwarks
of the mighty and the powerful.
V. THE LEssONS OF POLETOWN: PUBLIC POLICY AND LEGAL REFORM
Not only did many Poletowners, with no little cause, come away from
the C.I.P. controversy with the feeling that an injustice had been done them,
but many sympathizers of the Central Industrial Park also questioned how
City officials made and implemented decisions pertaining to the project. This
suggests problems in the way the City Administration performed and the way
in which the law and the courts operated. In three particular areas, specific
reforms seem warranted.
The first area for reform involves administrative practices, or the way
in which public officials carry out public policy in situations like the land
acquisition in Poletown. Since the neighborhood was never homogeneous, the
City was able to use existing divisions to implement policy without working
to build a consensus within the community as it had painstakingly done with
the large power holders, G.M., HUD, the U.A.W., and the Archdiocese. The
activation of a Citizens District Council for the C.I.P. area seemingly was
intended more to co-opt dissent and to marshal support than to represent
citizens or ameliorate adversity. Similarly, the creation of an Economic
Development Corporation to carry out the project, while affording speed and
flexibility, also sheltered City officials from criticism and allowed project plan-
ners to sidestep cumbersome, though perhaps more representative, ad-
ministrative procedures and practices."0 The result was a model of municipal
efficiency, to be sure, but not a showcase of democratic government.6'
In order to relieve this situation, urban planners, economic development
officers, and elected public officials should approach their constituents with
greater respect and cultural sensitivity. Two changes might encourage sensitivity.
Structurally, institutional power first needs to return to the neighborhoods
60. Id. at 49; see Lynn Bachelor Talk, supra note 25.
61. See Bachelor, supra note 28.
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whose communities might then have the political resources to demand greater
sensitivity from public officials. In 1919, Detroit's "progressive" reformers
abolished the ward system and instituted at-large elections as a means to root
out urban machine corruption. In the process, however, they also undercut
working-class immigrants' political clout.62 A return to ward-based represen-
tation might help give the neighborhoods a political voice. Legislative and
judicial recognition of community and individual rights and of cultural, social
and physical environments also might help. 63 Even without such changes,
neighborhoods need not stand defenseless. They can marshal the resources
they do command, apply pressure, and build coalitions. As John Kromkowski,
President of the National Center for Urban Ethnic Affairs, has stressed,
neighborhoods also must rely upon their single unique asset, "people power."
Here the Poletowners' tactics may have failed them. Before one litigates, one
must organize.6"
Regardless of the foregoing suggestions, in some cases of urban develop-
ment, neighborhoods still may have to come down for the greater public good.
It is beyond the scope of this article to wrestle with, let alone resolve, that
most momentous issue that has confounded both policymakers and social scien-
tists: exactly what constitutes "community"? 6- However it is resolved, con-
sideration of whether a neighborhood is also a "community" should help order
policy priorities. In those painful cases in which neighborhoods must be razed
and communities destroyed, the existence of community should increase claims
for compensation. Fair public policy should follow three procedural rules.
First, when conflict is resolved, the fewest people should lose, as they culturally
define the term. Second, those who have least to lose should not lose the most.
Finally, the losers should be justly compensated.
In a situation like Poletown, what is "compensation"? The normal defini-
tion of just compensation as market price, a sum that might have been agreed
upon by a willing buyer and a willing seller, was not "just" as many
Poletowners, community organizers, and social scientists understood the term.
Faced with powerful non-market pressures, few residents who chose to sell
their homes to the City did so in a literally free market. The notion of the
willing seller, therefore, was a sham. Meanwhile, those awarded a settlement
by the courts often got far less than they believed they deserved. Poletown
homeowners often failed to recieve replacement costs for their condemned
homes. Small-business proprietors got paid for their aging buildings but did
not get compensated for their businesses' good will, and did not share much
in the rapid appreciation of the value of their land.'6
62. Radzialowski, supra note 15, at 135.
63. Cf. Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 410 Mich. 616, 635, 304 N.W.
2d 455, 460 (1981).
64. I am indebted to John Kromkowski for his incisive comments at the Francis Lewis
Law Center Colloquium.
65. For an accessible introduction to the debates on the meaning of "community", see
JOSEPH R. GUSFIELD, COMMUNITY: A CRITICAL RESPONSE (1975).
66. Detroit Free Press, Nov. 9, 1980.
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A far more just compensation might have redressed these inadequacies.
It might have started with the fair market value of the land on which the
homes and businesses stood, as fair market value is usually understood. Com-
pensation also should have included an estimated replacement cost, an estimate
of what it would cost to construct a new building of the same size and style
as the structure being condemned, possibly less a depreciation factor. Finally,
compensation should have included an arbitrary amount for lost "community",
or with a business, good will, an amount perhaps related to the number of
years a homeowner or business proprietor occupied a building, or the number
of years they lived in the community. 67
Fairer still and probably not unfeasible or even impractical, displaced
residents might have been awarded a "piece of the action," a share in the
profits that would be generated by the new project for which their homes
and businesses were condemned. Precedent for this kind of largesse exists.
In Atlanta, thirty-nine black families, far better organized than the Poletowners,
lost their neighborhood to a commercial development, but received valuable
shares in the subsequent project.68 Alternatively, and admittedly far less prac-
tically, compensation could even reflect a literally free market in which the
dispossessed might have an opportunity to name their own price and developers
like G.M. and the City would be obliged to make each Poletowner an offer
he or she would not refuse. I suggest this final alternative, however expensive,
redistributive, and ultimately perhaps impractical, in order to suggest that there
are many possible determinations of just compensation, all arguably valid.
Alas, justice is not cheap. In the long run, however, injustice may prove more
expensive still, in terms of lost legitimacy of our legal and political institu-
tions, bad legal precedent, and the resulting violence to the larger public good.
The second area for reform involves the operation of the courts as an
arena for conflict resolution. Although Mr. Reosti undoubtedly represented
his client's interests quite ably, he could be no real match for General Motors
or even the City of Detroit. Underfunding and limits on their scope probably
would make equally poor opponents of most of the public and private legal
assistance programs that poliferated during the 1960's and thereafter to pro-
vide basic services to the neediest members of society and probably far spot-
tier help to the average American citizen. A way to begin to redress this im-
balance might be to create an independent office of investigation and legal
assistance, perhaps patterned after the ombudsman, that might provide help
in both civil and criminal cases.6 9 Already we have an example of such an
office in the New Jersey Department of the Public Advocate. Created in the
spring of 1974, this innovative state-funded public interest law office received
67. I should like to thank Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr., for suggesting this formula.
68. See Roger Witherspoon, Profits Out of Thin Air in Johnsontown, BLACK ENTERPRISE
65-68 (Dec. 1982). I am indebted to Prof. Steven H. Hobbs of the Washington and Lee Law
School for bringing this article to my attention.
69. See, e.g., WALTER GELLHOR., OMMMsMAN AND OTHERS: CITIZENS' PROTECTORS IN NnE
COUNTRIES (1966).
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broad discretionary power from the state legislature to define the public in-
terest and to champion it in the courts. Whether such an office would remain
free from political or corporate influence remains an open question. Of greater
public policy and philosophical concern, meanwhile, is another question: how
would such an office define what is the public interest? At worst, this new
tier of government might merely shift the locus of conflict from the courts
and the legislative councils to less respresentative, responsive, and accoun-
table bureaucratic offices. The presumption in its creation, however, was that
a public ombudsman and advocate would seek to represent the unrepresented,
disadvantaged, and underrepresented. Judging by the New Jersey record, in
the issue areas in which the Public Advocate's office was most active, housing
and community development, health care, employment, and the environment,
at least much of the time this was the case.70 Whether such an office could
have championed the Poletowners' cause, however, cannot be determined. As
we examine a sample year, 1980, in New Jersey, no comparable controversy
appeared on the Public Advocate Office's docket.7 '
Finally, the third area for reform addresses the problem that seems to
exist when giant corporations manipulate, influence, and otherwise control
the courts, the law, and public policy. We may lament evil in the corporate
board room, but I do not, and we should not, champion or expect the rise
of corporate morality as an antidote to the problem. Rather, insitutional reform
should aim at reversing this condition, in short, at controlling the giant cor-
porations. More regulation, not less, is the answer. Regulation alone is not
the answer, because we have amply seen how regulatory bodies often have
become the creatures of the regulated. What the law and the courts must
do is redefine the corporation.
Here we can learn much from this history of the corporation. 3 Eighteenth-
century law did not draw the clear distinction between public and private cor-
porations which Justice Story claimed in the famous Dartmouth College case
and that henceforth would guide the course of American jurisprudence.7 4
Rather, corporations were agencies of government, "endowed with public at-
tributes, exclusive privileges, and political power, and designed to serve a social
70. Martin A. Bierbaum, On the Frontiers of Public Interest Law: The New Jersey State
Department of the Public Advocate - The Public Interest Advocacy Division, 13 SETON HALL
L. REv. 475-89 (1983). I would like to thank Prof. Steven H. Hobbs of the Washington and
Lee Law School for calling this and the following report to my attention.
71. See 1980 Annual Report of the Department of the Public Advocate and the Office
of the Public Defender (New Jersey).
72. I should like to thank Prof. Denis Brion of the Washington and Lee Law School for
underscoring this fact in a conversation at the Frances Lewis Law Center Colloquium.
73. See RONALD E. SEAVOY, THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN BUSINESS CORPORATION:
BROADENING THE CONCEPT OF PUBLIC SERVICE DURING INDUSTRIALIZATION (1982); MORTON, J.
HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AmRIcAN LAW, 1780-1860 (1977); OSCAR & MARY F. HANDUN,
COMMONWEALTH: A STUDY OF THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN THE AMERICAN ECONOMY:
MASSACHUSETTS, 1774-1861 (revised ed. 1969); Oscar & Mary F. Handlin, Origins of the American
Business Corporation, V J. ECON. HIST. 1-21 (1945).
74. Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 WHEAT.) 518, 668-69 (1819).
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function for the state," often extending the avenues of commerce through
transportation related enterprises.7" The mythology of the free enterprise system
since usually has explained the rise of the corporation in terms of the unique
advantage it offered to limit the liability of investors. Limited liability, however,
was easily obtainable in other ways. The real attractiveness of the corporation
during this early period was less subtle: it formed a state-sanctioned monopoly.
Thereafter, the meaning of the corporation steadily widened with changing
economic conditions. It came to include manufacturing activities and, after
the Dartmouth College case, was steadily "privatized", through a succession
of precedent-setting decisions by Justices Story, Marshall, and later, Taney.
As a result, the corporation reached its present form near the end of the nine-
teenth century, a form virtually impregnable under present law.
In the long history of American law, however, a countervailing tradition
doubtless existed which retained the older notion of the corporation as a public
body. It is in that tradition and its historical roots that we may find a potent
source for contemporary legal and social reform. Seating of union or public
representatives on corporate boards, an innovation already common in Europe
and pioneered in this country by U.A.W. President Douglas Fraser in the
Chrysler concession talks, may one day be seen as an important step toward
redefining the corporation as a public entity. Of course, one recent experience
with a public corporation, the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), has proven
unusually disheartening. In its dealings with the public, more often than not
the TVA has aped the giant private utilities."6 Every corporation-made-public,
however, need not follow suit. We should ask what would make a corpora-
tion more responsive to the public interest. Certainly, the presence of a few
professional politicians on a corporate board would not necessarily fill the
bill, but genuine labor, minority, or community representation, in significant
voting numbers, could. Of course, how they voted in a case like the Poletown
dispute would depend upon an assortment of situational factors, their per-
sonalities, and their respective stakes in the affected communities. At the very
least, however, their presence in the corporate inner sanctum might dislodge
sufficient technical information about the workings of the corporation to render
effective public scrutiny more possible. At best, such a presence might check
the greatest excesses in selfish corporate policies.
A change in legal thinking must occur that would underscore the public
nature of the corporate giant and thereby make it more responsive to societal
needs and publicly more accountable. Unfortunately, the C.I.P. controversy
and the Poletown case have signalled a trend in the opposite direction, but
perhaps even this particularly dark cloud has its silver lining. If the Michigan
Supreme Court's decision in Poletown was an attack on all private property
rights, as Justice Ryan feared, perhaps some serendipitous good will still come
75. Handlin & Handlin, Origins of the American Business Corporation, supra note 73,
at 22; see also Poletown Neighborhood Association v. City of Detroit, 410 Mich. 616, 670-71,
304 N.W. 2d 455, 476 (1981) (Ryan, J., dissenting).
76. Thanks again go to Denis Brion, for citing the TVA situation.
1984]
WASHINGTON AND LEE LA W REVIEW
of that decision. In order to advance public purposes, corporate property rights
also might one day legally be assailed. Perhaps the time finally has come when
the American public policy debate should discuss nationalization of select large
industries as a legitimate public policy option. This alternative would not offer
a perfect solution to problems like those encountered by the residents of
Poletown, but would certainly institutionalize greater public accountability in
corporate affairs. Meanwhile, in the future public policy makers should, at
the very least, think of ways that a quid pro quo might be extracted from
corporations seeking government favors and incentives like tax abatements,
subsidies, or the demolition of an urban neighborhood. That quid pro quo
might include greater accountability and even a degree of public control, not
to mention corporate underwriting of equitable compensation to aggrieved
citizens."'
77. See Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 410 Mich. 616, 679, 304 N.W. 2d 455,
480 (1981) (Ryan, J., dissenting).
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